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TECHNOLOGY, NEWS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY: 
THE MEDIA'S INCREASING CAPABILITY TO COVER 
WAR 
Richard Davis 
Brigham Young University 
The victorious conclusion of the Persian Gulf War demonstrated 
not only US military prowess, but also the ability of the US 
government to handle coverage of the conflict by American news 
media. 
However, the Persian Gulf War also demonstrated the extent 
to which the press, through technological innovation, has become 
a major communications link in wartime and a major threat to 
governmental control of information flow. Moreover, this con-
flict presaged the press' future capability to affect the conduct of 
war through competition with government over the flow of 
military-related information. 
Essentially, the news media today, due to increased techno-
logical capability, have created a dilemma for policymakers by 
pitting the rights of free press and public knowledge of govern-
mental activity against the imperatives of national security. This 
article will examine the technological innovations which have 
enhanced the newsgathering role of the press and challenged 
governments' oligopoly of information. It will also assess the 
effect of these developments on military-press relations during a 
time of war. 
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WAR REPORTING 
Several new technologies have increased the news media's capa-
bility to gather and report news. These technologies have re-
shaped the newsgathering process, especially in wartime, by 
enhancing the press' capability to gather and report stories com-
prehensively and rapidly without technological reliance on non-
media sources, particularly government 
69 
BROADCAST SATELLITES 
The most dramatic has been the development of the satellite. 
Broadcast satellites were used by the press during the Vietnam 
War. However, at that time there was some delay and great 
expense in the transmission of pictures from the war zone back to 
the US. Film shot in Vietnam first had to be flown toTokyo,Hong 
Kong, or Bangkok for processing and then relayed via satellite 
back to the United States. The excessive costs for transmission-
around $4,000 for ten minutes-guaranteed only those stories of 
major significance would be sent via satellite. 1 
Today, the costs for satellite transmission have diminished-
current rates are as low as $1,000 per hour.2 Uplinks now are 
mobile, making transmissions possible from any part of the globe. 
This technological innovation allows the television news audi-
ence to see live reports from practically anywhere. Due to mobile 
uplinks and satellite transmissions, during the Gulf War, Ameri-
cans were able to watch in their living rooms as Scud missiles 
landed in Riyadh and Tel Aviv. 
Broadcast satellites have eliminated the time lag between the 
occurrence of an event and the news reporting of it. With this 
technology, developments in a war can be viewed live via satellite 
as they happen. 
REMOTE-SENSING SATELLITES 
However, another type of satellite-the remote sensing satel-
lite-has also affected newsgathering in wartime and possesses 
even greater potential to affect government's information control. 
Remote-sensing satellites are the descendants of various forms of 
aerial reconnaissance used since World War II for military pur-
poses. In 1972, this technology became available for commercial 
uses when the US government privatized its non-military satellite 
system, which became known as Landsat. Today, remote sensing 
satellites are used for a variety of commercial and public purposes 
including weather forecasting, forestry, and land usage.3 
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But the news media have also seen their value for 
newsgathering, especially to cover military operations to which 
the press has been denied access on the ground. Through remote-
sensing imagery, news organizations could follow military ma-
neuvers on the ground without actually having to be in the war 
zone. They could independently assess governmental claims and 
acquire knowledge of preparation for attacks by either side before 
they were announced. 
Despite this potential, there has been only limited use of 
remote-sensing imagery for newsgathering. The technology has 
just recently achieved commercial satellite resolution conducive 
to the visual detail of broadcast television. However, a major 
barrier for broadcast news organizations is unlimited access to the 
imagery. No news media organization or group of organizations 
now owns a remote sensing satellite. In order to do so, they must 
obtain a license from the US government, which is unlikely to 
grant it. 
Such a license probably would not be granted due to provi-
sions in the Landsat Act of 1984 passed to establish legal guide-
lines for usage of remote-sensing satellites. The act allows the 
government to ban dissemination of information obtained from 
remote-sensing imagery that it perceives as harmful to national 
security or the international obligations of the US. Under the 
provisions of the act, even if a news organization received such a 
license, the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to revoke it at 
any time or impose civil penalties for non-compliance.4 Since 
news organizations possessing such imagery would use it to 
independently assess military efforts and report on them, the 
government would likely see that as harmful to national security 
and international obligations. 
However, some news organizations have bought photo-
graphs taken by remote-sensing satellite cameras owned by non-
media organizations. These have resulted in dramatic disclosures 
previously not publicly admitted by governments. For example, 
American broadcast networks received pictures, taken from a 
Swedish commercial remote-sensing satellite, of the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant in 1986, which revealed the full extent of the 
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reactor damage. The Soviet government was forced to admit the 
extent of the catastrophe after the imagery provided by the 
Swedish satellite was disseminated worldwide. Another such 
incident occurred two years later when imagery from the same 
satellite made two other discoveries-the previously secret loca-
tion in Saudi Arabia of intermediate range missiles purcha sed 
from the Chinese government and the location of a 1957 nuclear 
disaster in the Soviet Union never admitted by the Soviet govem-
ment.5 
But the first real test of this capability during an active 
military conflict war at the time of the Persian Gulf War. In 
October 1990, ABC News bought imagery from a Soviet satellite 
company, but was fearful of using it because of what it showed, 
or rather did not show. The imagery clearly revealed the huge 
allied troop deployment in northern Saudi Arabia. But, signifi-
cantly, ABC News and the imagery experts it recruited to examine 
the images found no evidence of any large-scale buildup of Iraqi 
forces in Kuwait. This was a direct contradiction of US govern-
ment assertions. Rather than display these photographs on net-
work television and risk incurring the wrath of the Bush adminis-
tration and the network's own credibility if they were wrong, an 
ABC News producer leaked their dilemma to Newsweek, which 
ran a short story about it. 6 
One cause of the discrepancy was the placement of Iraqi 
forces in concealed bunkers. But another more serious one was 
the low resolution of the photographs. While the Soviet comm er-
cial satellite could see objects as small as 5 meters wide, such as 
individual houses, US military remote sensing satellites have 
much better resolution. 
As the commercial technology improves, the difference 
between military and commercial capability eventually will dis-
appear. However, whether an American satellite with a lower 
resolution will ever be licensed is problematic. 
One limitation had been meter resolution. Reportedly , a 
classified executive order signed in the late 1970s established 10 
meters as the highest possible resolution for commercial satellites 
licensed in the US.7 However, in 1987, the Reagan administrati on 
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rescinded such a restriction and settled on one to two meters as the 
limit for national security concerns. 8 
The more liberal limitation will facilitate proliferation of high 
resolution imagery for news gathering purposes by American 
news organizations. The remote-sensing satellite is a technology 
with potentially large-scale impact on newsgathering and report-
ing in a wartime setting. With construction and deployment of 
such satellites by other governments as well as non-governmental 
organizations, within a decade US government control of the 
technology will be non-existent. 
OTIIBR TECHNOLOGY 
In addition to broadcast and remote-sensing satellites, the media 
have acquired other technological capabilities such as lighter, 
more portable equipment. Minicams and the downsizing of 
camera equipment have facilitated high portability for news 
crews. They have also contributed to a reduction in the size of a 
camera crew from three technicians in the 1950s to two or even 
one technician today. Such reduction greatly enhances mobility 
for the reporter. For print journalists, fax machines and laptop 
computers have increased mobility and accelerated the news 
reporting process. 
Such technological innovations mean journalists can arrive 
in a war zone .sooner with less technical support and file stories 
faster than ever before. · 
EFFECTS ON TI-IE MILITARY-PRESS RELATIONSHIP 
These developments-increased autonomy and technological 
capabilities-have had their impact on the relationship between 
the military and the press in wartime. Several problems have 
arisen due to the presence of the press and the military's concern 
about its portrayal. 
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PRESS ACCESS 
One of the thorniest issues is the problem of press access to the 
battlefield. Journalists naturally want to observe the action 
firsthand to assure the credibility of military reports. However, 
the growth in size of the journalist corps covering wars has created 
major logistical problems for the Defense Department. 
This growth has been facilitated not only by the proliferation 
of professional news gathering organizations worldwide, but also 
by the news media's propensity to achieve greater autonomy from 
non-press sources, as well as from each other. Thus, each major 
news organization, and many not so major ones, send their own 
reporters, photographers, and technicians to cover the story. 
During the Persian Gulf conflict, the military public relations 
office facilitated access not only for ABC, NBC, and CBS, but 
also W ABC, WNBC, and WCBS and a host of other regional and 
local newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and wire 
services. Add to that news organizations from other countries and 
the problem oflogistics in handling the press becomes enormous. 
The logistical problem was demonstrated in broadcast news 
coverage of the marine landing on the beaches of Somalia in 
December 1992. The lights of the camera crews representing a 
host of Western broadcast news organizations nearly blinded the 
marines and contributed to the appearance of a Hollywood set 
rather than a supposedly secret military operation. 
Some of the reluctance of the Reagan administration to allow 
reporters onto the island nation of Grenada with the first wave of 
troops in 1983 can be attributed to the enormity of the press corps. 
An estimated 400 members of the press sought to cover the 
invasion the first day.9 That was approximately one quarter the 
number of the first wave of US troops. Within several days, about 
7 50 journalists were on the island. That number exceeded the size 
of the press corps during the Vietnam War and constituted seven-
tenths of one percent of the entire population of the country. 10 
Field officers have complained they cannot conduct a war 
with that many journalists on the battlefield. They argue that the 
effort to keep track of that many noncombatants detracts from the 
74 
conduct of the military operations. Moreover, since most of these 
noncombatants are Americans, they feel a duty to protect them, 
which presents an additional task for ground forces. They also 
contend even the movement of such a large expeditionary force of 
journalists robs the military of valuable transportation assets-
trUcks, planes, helicopters-at a crucial period. 11 
Journalists respond that they are performing a crucial func-
tion in American democracy-playing watchdog over govern-
mental activity. Their job is to serve as the eyes and ears of a 
public unable to be there personally. When government with-
holds access to the press, journalists view it as an attempt to bar 
the American public from seeing what government is doing. In his 
criticism of the military's handling of the press in Grenada, NBC 
News commentator John Chancellor reflected this view when he 
remarked: "The American government is doing whatever it wants 
to, without any representative of the American public watch-
ing."12 
The problem of controlling access has become even more 
complicated with the newsgathering uses of remote-sensing sat-
ellites. With the purchase of remote-sensing imagery from 
commercial satellites, news organizations can view the progress 
of a military operation while still being denied access on the 
ground. 
The actual usage of this technology to follow events in real-
time may seem futuristic, but such capability is not far in the future 
for civilian satellite systems. By the mid-1990s, Landsat imagery 
for use by news organizations could have a processing time of 
only a few hours, which would allow near real-time capability. 
Moreover, the satellite will be re-directable in a short period of 
time, enhancing the ability of the press to move over a military 
action within a matter of hours.13 Those satellites will be limited 
to daytime observation without much cloud cover. However, over 
time even those impediments will probably be overcome as the 
commercial remote-sensing capability catches up with that of the 
current US military satellites. 
In response, _under the Landsat Act of 1984, the Secretary of 
Commerce may threaten to revoke licenses or impose civil pen-
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alties on US-based firms that sell such imagery to the news media. 
Such a threat would likely stop EOSAT, the owner of the Landsat 
satellite, from selling to the press. 
But American news media organizations, can still turn to 
non-US satellite companies, such as ABC did in the fall of 1990. 
With the proliferation of satellite firms during the next several 
years in countries such as Japan, India, Canada, and Brazil, access 
to imagery from abroad will be even easier and cheaper. 14 
The Defense Department may respond by placing a regula-
tory ban on publication or broadcast of such photographs. How-
ever, it may well be overturned by the Supreme Court as an 
unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the press. 
Even if such a ban were upheld, the federal government could 
not prevent the dissemination of such imagery by non-US 
sources. A Swedish-based news organization calling itself the 
Space Media Network was formed to buy imagery from commer-
cial satellites, analyze it, and disseminate it to world media 
organizations. The organization has broken stories based on 
imagery documenting Soviet laser weapons sites, the previously 
secret Saudi Arabia basing of intermediate range missiles pur-
chased from the Chinese government and the location of a 1957 
nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union never admitted by the Soviet 
government.15 In a US military conflict, the Space Media 
Network could readily provide information on US military activi-
ties that would be classified in the US and unavailable to the 
American public through American media, yet printed and 
broadcast worldwide. 
With the advent of broadcast satellites, the ability to limit 
what Americans see from other nations has nearly disappeared. 
For example, if the Canadian Broadcasting Company obtained 
sensitive military photographs, much of the extreme northern tier 
of the United States could see them on Canadian television news. 
With the proliferation of home satellite dishes, many Americans 
can receive foreign news programs directly from a broadcast 
satellite. Moreover, as home satellite systems become smaller 
and less expensive, they will proliferate and news from foreign 
broadcasts will become more difficult to control. 
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NEWS LEAKS AND BIAS 
The concern about the presence of journalists in the combat zone 
does not merely involve logistics. There is also a fear of the effects 
of the news sent back home. Those effects fall into two broad 
categories-national security and public relations. 
Administration officials assert that press reports can easily 
harm the war effort. The enemy may benefit from a free distribu-
tion of information about the activities of US troops. At the 
commencement of the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney declared that "even the most innocent-sounding informa-
tion could be used directly against the men and women whose 
lives are on the line carrying out these operations." 16 
The very technological developments that have enhanced the 
news media's ability to report news quickly have also increased 
the likelihood that such information will reach enemy hands. The 
Iraqis made no secret of the fact that Saddam Hussein was picking 
up CNN via satellite.17 Hordes of journalists running across the 
battlefield may well confuse both sides. 
There is also the fear of poor public relations-how the war 
will look to the folks back home. Military officials argue that the 
American public will not support war if it is shown graphically on 
television, especially at dinner time. One retired admiral com-
plained at a symposium that his concern was that when the press 
"write about us, you make us look bad."1 8 
Television has been blamed by some military officers and 
scholars for the evaporation of public support for the Vietnam 
War. It has been charged with purposely focusing on the body 
bags, the gore, and the confusion in wartime to scuttle US military 
actions.19 This fear animated the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions in their approach to media coverage of military actions. 
However, scholarly evidence to support the conventional 
wisdom that the press carries an anti-war bias has been lacking. 
Two studies of press coverage of the Vietnam War found that the 
press was largely supportive of the war until after public opinion 
had clearly turned against achieving a military victory.20 One 
study of 1200 television news stories concluded that two-thirds 
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were neutral, while twice as many of those with bias supported the 
administration's policy. In the same study, public affairs pro-
grams such as "Meet the Press" and "Issues and Answers" were 
studied for bias. The bias of the invited guests shifted from war 
supporters to opponents only after 1972, when public opinion had 
already changed.21 Another study of television news coverage 
concluded television news did not emphasize filmed coverage of 
the dead or wounded or even combat. 22 
This is true not only for Vietnam, but also subsequent military 
actions. During the five months of Desert Shield, the press was 
largely supportive of US role. One study of press coverage found 
nearly two-thirds of news sources cited in stories expressed 
support for US policy in the Gulf.23 Many of the stories focused 
on human interest, including stories about soldiers packing their 
bags and being loaded on military air transports, tales of a 
soldier's life in the desert, including boredom and frustration, and 
accounts of the varied efforts of Americans back home to suppon 
the troops through cards, letters, and free copies of newspapers 
dominated national news. One example of the early coverage was 
a Christian Science Monitor about Colin Powell's last words to 
departing troops: "Rarely in recent memory has a general offering 
such dockside sentiments spoken for so much of the United States 
as Powell did last Friday.''24 
The Pentagon apparently sought to maximize the favorable 
publicity by expanding the size of the press corps during Opera-
tion Desert Shield to include non-national media organizations. 
Under the auspices of the Pentagon's Hometown News Program, 
nearly 1000 reporters from local news outlets were flown on 
military aircraft to Saudi Arabia to cover the troops from their 
hometown. These regional and local media-small metropolitan 
newspapers and local radio and television stations--were per-
ceived as less critical since they are more interested in the 
hometown angle rather than the broad national policy perspective. 
The administrator of the program explained the program's ratio-
nale: "If [the media] know that they're getting a free ride and they 
can't afford the $2,000 ticket, there's probably going to be a 
tendency to say, 'We '11 do good stuff here. "'2 5 
78 
Although public support for the war effort did fluctuate 
throughout Desert Shield, it seemed more to follow events, such 
as the major buildup of troops in November, than media coverage. 
During Desert Storm, public support for the operation remained 
high, again a mirror of strong success in implementation of the 
policy rather than anything the media had to say. 
In sum, then, the press does not harbor an innate anti-war bias 
in its reporting. Rather, this commercial enterprise which relies 
on the public for sustained support, plays it safe by reflecting that 
public's opinion. 
However, free access to information that would be beneficial 
to an enemy is a problem yet to be resolved and the technological 
advances of the news media will aggravate the problem in the near 
future. 
GOVERNMENT AL RESPONSE 
In response to the logistical problems, security leaks, and the 
perception of a media antiwar bias (or at least a critical approach 
to governmental policy), recent administrations have sought to 
restrict th·e news media's autonomy in covering US military 
engagements. These restrictions have included denial of access to 
the combat zone, prohibitions on who can be interviewed, who 
and what can be photographed, and even censorship of stories 
before they are filed. 
Denial of Access. During the Grenada invasion, the press 
was denied access to the island until the third day of the operation. 
Even then it was a small pool. Up to the fifth day of the operation, 
no more than one-fourth of the journalists who sought entrance to 
Grenada were allowed in. In defense of his decision to exclude the 
press, the commanding officer of the American invasion force in 
Grenada later remarked that there were "other priorities to be dealt 
with" besides press access. 26 
However, the denial of access brought strong denunciations 
from the press. The Washington Post termed the policy "inexcus-
able" and opined that "the government set aside tried-and-true 
rules for ensuring the media and through them the people would 
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see, know, and understand in the most timely and credible way 
how it was exercising military power in their name."27 Time 
called it "a bad mistake, an outrage to press freedom, and an 
ominous symptom of a tendency in the Reagan administration to 
control the flow of information. "28 
Press Pools. In response to this criticism, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a panel to study the Defense 
Department's actions and the complaints of news organizations. 
Called the Sidle Panel, after its chairman, General Winant Sidle, 
the group recommended that for future actions the Pentagon form 
a National Media Pool to cover the early stages of a military 
action.29 The pool was designed to consist of a small number of 
reporters from several media organizations who would accom-
pany the first wave of any combat operation. By limiting the 
number of journalists, the logistical problem would be dealt with, 
while press access would not be completely denied. 
Both the military and the press concluded the concept could 
work well after trial pools were created to accompany military 
exercises immediately following its creation.30 However, the 
success of the real application of this pool has been mixed. The 
first demonstration in actual combat was the Panama invasion in 
December 1989. The pool was not allowed to accompany the first 
group of troops, nor was it allowed near the battle. Instead, it was 
treated to a succession of news briefings by lower ranking offi-
cials. 31 
The second experience, the Gulf War, was somewhat more 
positive. Twenty pool reporters did accompany the first troops 
into Saudi Arabia during the deployment in August 1990.32 But 
the lack of immediate combat made this pool coverage far differ-
ent from the situations in Panama or Grenada. The pool was 
abandoned within a few weeks of US troop arrival and by October, 
several hundred journalists had poured into the area. 
However, on January 15, the eve of the commencement of 
Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon reinstituted the pool. In 
response to intense pressure from the press corps, the pools were 
expanded near the end of the Gulf War. But accounts di ff er on the 
extent of that expansion. One press account describes no more 
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than five pools with seven reporters each or35 reporters in all were 
allowed to accompany the troops.33 However, another account 
suggests that there were more than 190 reporters accompanying 
combat forces at the beginning of the ground assault on February 
24.34 Regardless, neither number constitutes more than a small 
fraction of the 1400 journalists who were assigned to cover the 
war.35 
Unilaterals. Press frustration with limitations on access 
have spurred some journalists to become "unilaterals" who cover 
the front on their own. During the Grenada operation, some 
enterprising reporters rented a motorboat and landed on Grenada. 
However, they were discovered and detained for two days by US 
troops. 
Independents were common during the Panama invasion 
since several reporters were already located in Panama City 
before the invasion and the urban nature of the conflict inhibited 
military control of the combat zone. 
Several reporters went "independent" during the Gulf War, 
some of whom were eventually captured by Iraqi forces and 
detained. Some joined up with allied forces, such as the Egyptians 
and the Saudis. CBS News correspondent Forrest Sawyer became 
the only reporter to accompany a pilot on a bombing mission 
because he abandoned the pool system and travelled with the 
Saudis.36 The most well known unilateral was Bob Simon, the 
CBS News correspondent who, with his camera crew, was de-
tained in Baghdad for several weeks until the end of the war. 
The vast size of both the operation and the combat zone in the 
Persian Gulf War encouraged independence, even though the 
military threatened punishments for press who ignored the pool 
system. According to one journalist who became a unilateral, 
most troops in the field welcomed him when he showed up 
unexpectedly and even some of the field commanders winked in 
his presence.37 
Interviews. Interviews have also been limited. In Vietnam, 
journalists were allowed to interview any member of the US 
armed forces. In fact, their best sources were not high ranking 
officers, but middle or lower ranking officers who understood the 
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war in the field much better than their superiors. 
That was not true in the Gulf War. Journalists were allowed 
to interview people only with the assent of the public relations 
officials, and often with those public relations officials standing 
off to one side.38 In Panama, interviews with wounded soldiers 
or Panamanian prisoners were banned. 39 
Visual Portrayal. Photographs and videos were banned in 
some situations. During the Panama invasion, pictures of dam-
aged helicopters or dead servicemen were prohibited.40 The 
Pentagon provided edited Defense Department videotape of the 
combat. 
In the Gulf War, no pictures of the caskets arriving at Dover 
Air Force Base were allowed.41 Rather than deny broadcast 
media requests for videotape of the bombing runs which missed 
their targets, the public affairs officers merely postponed the issue 
until the timeliness of the story of the air war had passed.42 
Censorship. However, the most controversial policy during 
the Gulf War was the imposition of censorship on press dis-
patches. On January 9, 1991, the Defense Department announced 
that all reports from press pools would be subject to a "security 
review." 43 
Not since Korea had the press been subject to prior restraint. 
News organizations were so upset that thirteen publications and 
writers charged the rules were unconstitutional and sued the 
Defense Department. 44 Following the war, representatives of 15 
major news organizations wrote to Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney complaining that the "flow of information to the public 
was blocked, impede, or diminished by the policies and practices 
of the Department of Defense" and expressing their fear that the 
Gulf War policies will become "a model for the future."45 
As a warning to its readers, as well as a subtle commentary on 
the Pentagon's policy, the New York Times added a box near its 
Gulf war stories which read: 
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-Censors Screen Pooled Reports 
The American-led military command in 
Saudi Arabia has put into effect press 
restrictions under which journalists are 
assembled in groups and given access to 
military sources. 
The pool reporters obtain information 
while under military escort, and their ac-
counts are subject to scrutiny by military 
censors before being distributed. Some of 
the information appearing today on 
American military operations was ob-
tained under such circumstances. 
Members of the press were not the only opponents to censor-
ship. One former Pentagon spokesman viewed the policy as a 
potential tool to "protect the military from criticism or embarrass-
ment. "46 
The Defense Department argued press censorship was neces-
sary to prevent press revelations of troop movements or locations. 
The rationale for this limitation was such information was not of 
great value to the American public, but could be quite useful to the 
enemy force. If the ability of the nation to win is hampered by the 
freedom to reveal such information and the lives of many mem-
bers of the armed services would be in danger, then such a freedom 
ultimately endangers the nation and would have to be sacrificed. 
Moreover, the US Supreme Court has already voiced at least 
theoretical support for such a move.47 
However, there is no empirical evidence the press has been 
the cause of major national security breaches during recent 
conflicts . A study of media-military relations during the Vietnam 
War concluded that not one breach could be confirmed where the 
North Vietnamese could take advantage or didn't have other 
means to gain that knowledge. 48 
Moreover, journalists argued military censorship during the 
Persian Gulf War went far beyond security leaks. When those 
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sources made some remark which the military censors thought 
would be impolitic, they were excised from the stories before 
filing. For example, one journalist's story described US pilots 
returning from a bombing run as "giddy." Military censors 
changed the word to "proud. "49 
The censors also seemed to be controlling the information 
flow for the best public relations advantage. A story about the 
bombing of Iraq's nuclear weapons development plants was 
refused. Two days later, General Norman Schwarzkopf made it 
public. 50 
Information considered potentially offensive to US allies was 
excised. For example, during the Gulf War US marines partici-
pated in a field battle in a small Saudi Arabian city on the border 
with Kuwait. However, word of that involvement was not widely 
disseminated. Due to the high sensitivity of the Arabs to this issue, 
the US sought to minimize US role.51 The Saudis also played a 
role in US news media coverage by initially limiting the number 
of American journalists who could accompany US troops to Saudi 
Arabia. 52 
PUBLIC OPINION AND PRESS RESTRICTIONS 
These restrictions have received broad support from the American 
public. During the Gulf War, media complaints about censorship 
and denial of access fell on deaf public ears. In late January 1991, 
surveys revealed broad public support for restrictions · on media 
reporting of the war. 
More specifically, the pool system received tacit report when 
a majority of respondents of a Times-Mirror survey said Ameri-
can reporters who bypassed the pool system were going too far to 
get a story. In the same survey, a large majority expressed support 
for the view that military censorship is more important than the 
media's ability to report important news, and they also believed 
the military was not holding back bad news but was telling as 
much as it can. 53 
However, after the war was over and Americans began to 
reflect, there were some changes in that support For example, in 
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a March 1991 survey by the Times-Mirror corporation, 72 percent 
of the respondents believed at least some information about the 
war was kept from the public. Over half expressed approval of 
American news organizations broadcasting Iraq government-
censored news, compared with less than half in January. There 
was also broad support expressed for the media's role as observer. 
Seventy percent said neutral news coverage of a war was better 
than pro- American Coverage.54 
In the heat of the moment, the public is most concerned about 
the pursuit of the war. However, in retrospect, the public voices 
support for an independent press during wartime. 
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WAR 
The succession of military actions during the 1980s and early 
1990s and the resulting furor over news media coverage have 
produced calls for reform of military-media relations. One 
proffered solution for future military actions is a ban on television 
cameras. 55 Still another is a prohibition on live coverage of 
combat. 56 
But the preceding discussion has demonstrated that such 
simple solutions are logistically impossible, if not ethically and 
constitutionally unsupportable. The current technology allows 
news media organizations to challenge the government's control 
of information about military operations. Technology that will be 
operational within this decade will completely eliminate the 
governmental advantage. Nor is there much the US government 
at this time legally can do about it. 
The not-too-distant technological capability of the press will 
require the Defense Department to adopt new means for preserv-
ing national security rather than placing restrictions on the role of 
the press. Failure to plan for this eventuality guarantees future 
legal and ethical battles in the military-media relationship. 
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